

SECRET

29 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul Walsh, DD/OER

SUBJECT : Comments on DIA Draft Cable to MACV Concerning  
Order of Battle Definitions

ATTACHMENT : DIA Draft Cable

1. The following comments are forwarded in response to your request of 26 July 1968.

Maneuver Units

2. Disagreements between CIA and DIA over the definitions of maneuver units centered on the textual comments following the definition proper. CIA has maintained that the OB should include estimates of maneuver units in the OB. DIA has been reluctant to insist on such inclusions. The DIA draft cable attempts to reconcile the differences by concluding that "we would be satisfied with a single strength figure, either nationally or by corps area as an estimate which could be a separate part of the OB summary, or transmitted separately." (Italics supplied).

3. By allowing MACV to transmit a single strength figure separately, DIA has:

a. let MACV make an estimate separate from the OB  
(thereby implying the OB need not include estimates,  
at least in this category)

b. yet required MACV to send in an estimates anyway.

4. Thus DIA has thrown one bone each to MACV and CIA. Whether we want to accept ours depends on how strongly we feel about the principle that an OB of necessity should include estimates. If we insist on the principle, I would recommend deleting the phrase "or transmitted separately." The phrase "at least in an estimate" (in the second sentence of the comments) would also have to go.

SECRET

**SECRET**Administrative Services

5. The new definition for Administrative Services has dropped an earlier CIA recommendation that the Administrative Services include "personnel subordinate to command elements outside South Vietnam" serving in South Vietnam or adjacent areas. The definition as it now reads would allow MACV to exclude such formations as the 559th Transportation Group. Several thousand members of the 559th are located in South Vietnam and in the lower Panhandle of Laos. (The 559th is directly subordinate to Rear Services headquarters in Hanoi.)

6. The comments on the definition include the sentence that "Elements operating in the border areas can (Italics supplied), be included in estimates, but their addition does not appear to be necessary until such time as they meet MACV criteria for acceptance." DIA's purpose in including this sentence is unclear. It would appear to let MACV off the hook for border area units. I would recommend that CIA suggest that the phrase "and Administrative Service elements serving in border areas", be tacked on to the first sentence of the comments. The sentence would therefore read: "The new definition allows the inclusion of front administrative service personnel and administrative service units serving in border areas."

Guerrillas

7. DIA has deleted the sentence in the guerrilla definition that "Typical missions for guerrillas include collection of taxes, propaganda, defense of home areas and occasional offensive/harrassing operations." Good idea.

8. The DIA comments on the guerrilla definition includes the sentence that "It is not expected that MACV should attempt to break out village, hamlet, and secret guerrillas unless information becomes available." Given the hazy nature of the evidence concerning guerrillas, I do not feel such an attempt should be required from, or expected of MACV. Information concerning ratios of village/hamlet/secret guerrillas is available (although cloudy), so I would recommend either dropping the phrase "...unless information becomes available," or amending it to read "unless firm information becomes available." A minor point, perhaps not worth making.

Infrastructure

9. DIA's paragraph 2d asks the question whether the "current

**SECRET**


**SECRET**

strength as reported by MACV excludes the personnel at hamlet level, some of whom are actually listed in ICEX total of eliminations?"

10. MACV's reported total of 80,000-odd in fact includes some 30-35,000 infrastructure members serving at hamlet level. ICEX "elimination" reports include many from hamlet level (as well as from other levels) who were never included in the MACV-reported total, however.

11. The question might be rephrased as follows: "To what extent does the current infrastructure strength as reported by MACV exclude personnel listed in ICEX totals of eliminations."

12. I would strongly recommend that if deliberations are held in Saigon concerning the definition of an "Insurgency Base", or the size of the infrastructure, that CIA and DIA send observers, who should be in close touch with their respective headquarters. Since tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of enemy bodies are involved, leaving their fate to MACV and ICEX seems a risky business. We would do well to monitor, if not control, discussions concerning terminology and accounting procedures.



Acting Chief  
South Vietnam Branch

25X11

**SECRET**